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Abstract 
Inflation-targeting central banks around the world often state their inflation objectives 
with regard to the consumer price index (CPI). Yet the literature on optimal monetary 
policy based on models with nominal rigidities and more than one sector suggests that 
CPI inflation is not always the best choice from a social welfare perspective. We revisit 
this issue in the context of an estimated multi-sector New-Keynesian small open 
economy model where sectors are heterogeneous along multiple dimensions. With key 
parameters of the model estimated using data from an inflation targeting economy, 
namely Canada, we particularly focus on (i) the role of sector-specific real rigidities, 
specially in the form of factor mobility costs, and (ii) welfare implications of targeting 
alternative price indices. Our estimations reveal considerable heterogeneity across 
sectors, and in several dimensions. Moreover, in contrast to existing studies, our welfare 
analysis comparing simple optimized policy rules based on alternative sectoral inflation 
rates provides support for CPI-based targeting policies by central banks. Capital mobility 
costs matter importantly in this regard. 
JEL classification: E4, E52, F3, F4 
Bank classification: Inflation: costs and benefits; Inflation and prices; Inflation targets; 
Monetary policy framework; Monetary policy implementation 
Résumé 
Les banques centrales de par le monde qui poursuivent des cibles d’inflation fixent 
fréquemment leurs objectifs par référence à l’indice des prix à la consommation (IPC). 
Or, selon la littérature qui fait appel, pour l’analyse de la politique monétaire optimale, à 
des modèles multisectoriels englobant des rigidités nominales, l’IPC ne serait pas 
toujours le meilleur étalon sous l’aspect du bien-être social. Les auteurs examinent de 
nouveau la question en se servant d’un modèle de type nouveau keynésien représentant 
une petite économie ouverte composée de plusieurs secteurs hétérogènes à différents 
égards. Ils estiment les principaux paramètres du modèle au moyen de données tirées 
d’une économie à régime de cibles d’inflation, en l’occurrence le Canada. Ils étudient 
notamment le rôle des rigidités réelles sectorielles, tout particulièrement sous forme de 
coûts de mobilité des facteurs, et les conséquences pour le bien-être du choix d’indices de 
prix autres que l’IPC. Leurs estimations révèlent une hétérogénéité intersectorielle 
appréciable, et ce, à plusieurs titres. Qui plus est, leur analyse du bien-être, fondée sur 
une comparaison de règles de politique monétaire simples et optimales sur la base de 
différents taux d’inflation sectoriels, accrédite les politiques de ciblage de l’inflation 
d’après l’IPC pratiquées par les banques centrales, à l’opposé des études antérieures. Les 
coûts de mobilité du capital sont déterminants à ce chapitre. 
Classification JEL : E4, E52, F3, F4 
Classification de la Banque : Inflation : coûts et avantages; Inflation et prix; Cibles en 
matière d’inflation; Cadre de la politique monétaire; Mise en œuvre de la politique 
monétaire 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The nineties witnessed a substantial increase in the number of countries adopting inﬂation-targeting
as their main monetary policy framework. These countries with explicitly-announced inﬂation
targets often stated those objectives based on the consumer price index (CPI).1 Yet, the literature
on optimal monetary policy based on dynamic models with multiple sources of nominal rigidities
(Erceg et al. 2000, Mankiw and Reis 2002; Woodford 2003; Benigno 2004; Huang and Liu 2005)
suggests that the CPI inﬂation is not always the best choice from a social welfare perspective. This
is the case because, unlike models with a single source of nominal rigidity (Aoki 2001), multi-sector
models with sectoral heterogeneity in price and/or wage rigidities display a trade-oﬀ between the
stabilization of deviations of output from its steady-state value (hereafter refered to as the output
gap) and multiple sectoral relative prices, which are not allocative-neutral. This trade-oﬀ implies
that stabilization of CPI inﬂation does not necessarily mean stabilization of the output gap.
In this paper, we revisit the choice of CPI inﬂation as an optimal guide to monetary policy
in the context of an estimated multi-sector New-Keynesian small open economy model with four
sectors (manufacturing, non-tradable, commodity, and imported goods) that are heterogeneous with
respect to: (i) the degree of price and wage nominal rigidity, (ii) labour inputs, (ii) the adjustment
cost of capital, and (iv) the stochastic process underlying the technology shocks. In particular,
we use the welfare implications of the model to quantitatively assess the relative merits of simple,
implementable policy reaction functions that include targeting the inﬂation rate of an aggregate
price index (e.g., CPI) versus a sectoral price index (e.g., tradables, nontradables, imports).
Our contribution to the debate regarding which price is the most desirable to target is two-
fold. First, in contrast with the existing literature which focuses on nominal rigidities, we highlight
the role of real rigidities in the form of factor mobility costs. As sectors diﬀer with respect to
their degree of nominal rigidities and the economy is hit by sector-speciﬁc shocks, monetary policy
will have asymmetric eﬀects in diﬀerent sectors, with potential allocative implications. To the
extent that sectoral (re)allocation of resources becomes costly due to the introduction of imperfect
labour mobility and sector-speciﬁc capital, we are able to explore another source of welfare loss
in the economy, which will add to the losses induced by nominal rigidities and by monopolistic
competition (i. e., price dispersion and suboptimal output) extensively discussed in the literature.
Second, the existing literature (see, for example, Beningo 2004) emphasizes that the optimal
price index to target will depend on the interplay between the shares of the diﬀerent sectors in the
economy and the diﬀerences in the sectoral degrees of nominal rigidities. Our conjecture is that
the extent of sector-speciﬁc capital adjustment costs should also matter in this regard. How much
it matters is a quantitative question and, for this reason, it becomes important to use parameter
1These include, for example, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden, Spain, France, Germany,
and Switzerland; a few of these targeting CPI without the eﬀects of indirect taxes and mortgage interest payments.
1values that reﬂect the reality of a well-established inﬂation-targeting economy in order to study
the welfare implications of targeting alternative price indices within policy reaction functions. We
follow the numerical approach used in Kollmann (2002), Ambler et al. (2004), Bergin et al. (2007),
and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) to calculate optimized policy functions in which the monetary
authority optimally chooses the Taylor rule coeﬃcients to stabilize inﬂation and output.2 In this
paper, we focus on the case of Canada to estimate our key parameters.3
Furthermore, although the main motivation for including real rigidities into the factor structure
is the need to capture some arguably realistic assumptions regarding the limited transferability of
labour skills and capital across sectors, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2007) suggest a further reason for using imperfectly-mobile capital with capital adjust-
ment costs in estimated medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. They argue
that these features help generate average frequencies of price adjustments that are much more in
line with values obtained from micro-based studies.
Since we use Canada as our benckmark inﬂation-targeting economy, a number of additional
features have been introduced in the model to better replicate important aspects of the Canadian
economy. For instance, we consider a monopolistically competitive importing sector that distributes
diﬀerentiated goods imported from Canada’s main trading partner − the United States − and the
rest of the world. This distinction among trade partners is important because of the pre-eminent
role played by the Canada-U.S. bilateral exchange rate in the dynamics of the various components
of Canadian inﬂation. In addition, as the price in the importing sector (expressed in domestic
currency) also displays stickiness, our set-up takes into account the evidence of incomplete exchange
rate pass-through in Canada (see, for example, Gagnon and Ihrig 2004).
I nt h es a m es p i r i t ,w ei n t r o d u c eac o m m o d i t ys ector that uses labour, capital, and natural
resource endowment (“land”). As Canada is a net exporter of this type of good, commodity prices
exogenously determined in the world economy have important eﬀects on the real exchange rate
and, thus, on inﬂation. Because commodity goods are used as inputs in the production of other
sectors, they contribute to the (incomplete) pass-through of shocks to commodity prices into the
Canadian economy.4
We also consider aspects related to the current globalized world economy that are likely to aﬀect
our small open economy directly. Thus, while we do not explain globalization itself, we account for
2As pointed out by De Paoli (2009), such a numerical approach is useful to evaluate optimal policy in complex and
fairly realistic open economy settings. An alternative would have been to examine the role of real rigidities within a
simpler framework and considering an analytical representation of the monetary authorithy’s problem as in Benigno
(2004).
3While our model is calibrated and estimated using Canadian data, its structure and the results would equally
apply to other commodity-exporting small open economies such as Australia, New Zealand, and Norway.
4See Dib (2008) for the importance of having such a commodities sector in a small open-economy model for
Canada. See also Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2009) who use input-output tables to describe in even ﬁner
detail the various levels of production.
2the possibility that relatively-persistent shocks from foreign sources can directly and markedly alter
the import and tradable sectors of our economy. Examples of such shocks can be, for instance, the
removal or addition of trade quotas and tariﬀs, changes in home bias and tastes, improvements in
the quality of imported goods, and declines in import costs due to increased internationalization
and the opening-up of new markets, that can potentially alter trade ﬂows importantly.
We estimate key structural parameters of the model using Bayesian methods as in Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007). We focus on parameters with a sector-speciﬁcd i m e n s i o n ,s u c ha sC a l v o -
price and -wage rigidities, capital adjustment costs, and the stochastic processes for exogenous
technology shocks, as well as the processes for the shocks to foreign variables. Our estimations ﬁnd
support for signiﬁcant heterogeneity across sectors and along many dimensions. In particular, the
sector that produces nontradable goods stands out as the one with the most rigid prices and wages,
with the most costly stock of capital to adjust, and with the most persistent and volatile technology
shock. As that sector’s production is also the one with the highest share in the Canadian economy,
its underlying characteristics turn out to be very important for our results.
Using the estimated parameters, we next solve the model’s equilibrium conditions to a second-
order approximation around the deterministic steady-state and compare the welfare implications
of ﬁve alternative monetary policy rules. We focus on policy reaction functions with a “smoothing
term,” whereby the central bank changes the nominal interest rate in reaction to last period’s
interest rate, current inﬂation and the output gap. The alternative options diﬀer with respect to
the price index or inﬂation rate targeted by the monetary authority.5 Ortega and Rebei (2006),
using a similar approach in a two-sector model without sector-speciﬁc capital adjustment costs ﬁnd
that the best option is to target the inﬂation rate of nontradables, which they also identify as the
sector with the stickiest prices. In contrast, our main ﬁnding is that the highest welfare level is
achieved by targeting CPI inﬂation rather than any of the inﬂation rates of the remaining sectors,
thus conﬁrming the soundness of CPI-based targeting policy by the Bank of Canada. The ranking
of policies is maintained when price-level targeting is considered. Interestingly, when we shut down
the capital adjustment costs, targeting the inﬂation rate of the nontradable sector becomes the best
option, which highlights the importance of real rigidities in this regard.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main features of the model. Section 3
describes the data, the calibration of selected parameters, as well as the estimation results. Section
4 reports and discusses the simulation results of the model. Section 5 oﬀers some conclusions.
5In all our welfare calculations policy reaction functions include deviations of inﬂation (price index) from its
steady-state value which is calibrated to reﬂect the target level of inﬂation (price index).
32 The Model
We consider a variant of the small open economy model proposed by Dib (2008) for Canada, which
builds upon earlier work by Mendoza (1991), Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), and Kollmann
(2001).6 The economy consists of households, a government, a monetary authority (or central bank),
and a multi-tiered production sector. The latter is structured as follows: a domestic commodity
sector exports some of its production and supplies the rest domestically to the manufacturing
and the non-tradables sectors of the economy. The manufacturing sector produces goods that are
exported or used domestically, and the non-tradables sector produces goods that are destined only
for the local market. Foreign goods are imported from diﬀerent external sources and combined with
manufactured goods to yield an aggregate tradable good. The ﬁnal stage of the production process
consists in aggregating tradable and non-tradable goods in order to produce ﬁnal consumption
goods.7
Households set monopolistically competitive wages. Monopolistic competition is also assumed in
all the intermediate stages of production, while perfect competition is considered in the commodities
and ﬁnal goods’ markets. In addition, various nominal rigidities are allowed in the economy. Wages,
as well as domestic, imported, intermediate, and ﬁnal goods’ prices are considered to be sticky à la
Calvo-Yun.
2.1 Households
Households in the economy are represented by a continuum indexed by  ∈ [01]. Each household





where 0 denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on information available at
period 0,  is the subjective discount factor, and (·) is a utility function that is strictly concave,
strictly increasing in , and strictly decreasing in .

























,w h e r e, ,a n d, represent hours worked
by the household  in manufacturing, non-tradable, and commodity sectors, which are indexed
by ,a n d, respectively. In addition,  is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
6A related paper that estimates a DSGE model using Canadian data is Justiniano and Preston (2009).
7Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2009) show that estimated models using a more detailed production structure
can better approximate sectoral nominal rigidities.
4substitution of consumption,  denotes the labour elasticity of substitution across sectors, and  is
the inverse of the Frisch wage elasticity of labour supply. All three parameters are assumed to be
strictly positive. Note that, except in the limit case where  →∞ , the household ’s labour supply,
,i sd i ﬀerent from
P
= , which implies that households do not perfectly substitute
their hours worked in the diﬀerent sectors.
Household  is a monopolistic supplier of diﬀerentiated labour services, selling these to a rep-
resentative competitive ﬁrm (a union) that transforms these into aggregate labour inputs for each










 =  (2)
In the above, , ,a n d denote aggregate labour supplied to manufacturing, non-
tradable, and commodity sectors, respectively, and the elasticity of substitution among the types of
labour is given by 1. From the labour union’s optimization problem, labour demand in sector







with  as the nominal wage of household  when working for sector . The nominal wage index









Households can buy or sell bonds denominated in foreign currency in incomplete international
ﬁnancial markets. We assume that all international bonds are denominated in U.S. dollars (USD)
and denote 
 as the nominal exchange rate between Canadian dollars (CAD) and USD. Household
 enters period  with  units of capital in the sector , −1 units of domestic treasury bonds,
and 
 ∗
−1 units of foreign bonds denominated in USD, where 
 is the U.S. price level and ∗

is the (real) foreign debt of the economy. During period  the household supplies labour and capital
to ﬁrms in all production sectors, receives total factor payment
P
=( + ),
where  is the nominal rental rate of capital in the sector , and receives factor payment of
natural resources, ,w h e r e is the nominal price of the natural resource input, ,a n d
 i st h es h a r eo ft h eh o u s e h o l d in natural resource payments.8 Furthermore, household  pays
a lump-sum tax Υ to the government and receives dividend payments from intermediate goods
producing ﬁrms, . The household uses some of its funds to purchase the ﬁnal good at the




0  =1 .




















−1 +  +  − Υ (5)
where  = ++ is total investment in the manufacturing, non-tradable, and commodity
sectors, respectively; and  =  +  +  is the total proﬁt from the manufacturing,
non-tradable and import sectors.
The foreign bond return rate, ∗
, depends on the foreign interest rate ∗
 and a country-
speciﬁcr i s kp r e m i u m. The foreign interest rate evolves exogenously according to the following
AR(1) process:
log(∗
)=( 1− ∗)log(∗)+∗ log(∗
−1)+∗ (6)
where ∗  1 is the steady-state value of ∗
, ∗ ∈ (−11) is an autoregressive coeﬃcient, and
∗ is uncorrelated and normally distributed innovation with zero mean and standard deviations
∗.
The country-speciﬁc risk premium is increasing in the foreign-debt-to-GDP ratio. It is given by










where κ  0 is a parameter that determines the ratio of foreign debt to GDP, and  is total real
GDP. The introduction of this risk premium ensures that the model has a unique steady state. It
is assumed that the U.S. inﬂation rate, ∗
 = 
 
−1, evolves according to:
log(∗
)=( 1− ∗)log(∗)+∗ log(∗
−1)+∗ (8)
where ∗  1 is the steady-state value of ∗
, ∗ ∈ (−11) is an autoregressive coeﬃcient, and ∗
is an uncorrelated and normally distributed innovation with zero mean and standard deviations
∗.
The stock of capital in the sector  evolves according to:
+1 =( 1− ) +  − Ψ(+1 ) (9)








is sector ’s capital-adjustment cost function that satisﬁes Ψ(0) = 0, Ψ0(·)  0 and Ψ
00
(·)  0.S i n c e
capital is sector-speciﬁc and costly to adjust, moving capital between two sectors requires adjust-
ment costs to be paid both in the sector that is investing and in the sector where the capital stock
is being reduced.
6Household  chooses  +1  and ∗
 to maximize its lifetime utility, subject to Eqs.
(5) and (9). The ﬁrst-order conditions, expressed in real terms, are:
−

















































in addition to the budget constraint, Eq. (5), to which the Lagrangian multiplier, , is associated;
 = ,  = −1,a n d 
 = 
 
  denote real capital return in the sector ,t h e
domestic CPI inﬂation rate, and the bilateral CAD/USD real exchange rate, respectively. Equations










Furthermore, there are three ﬁrst-order conditions for setting nominal wages in each sector ,
f , when household  is allowed to revise its nominal wages. As in Calvo (1983), this happens
with probability (1 − ) in the sector , at the beginning of each period .I fh o u s e h o l d is not
allowed to change its nominal wage, it fully indexes its wage to the steady-state inﬂation rate, ,a s
in Yun (1996). Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), household  sets his optimized nominal










 (+ +)++f ++
o#





























⎦ =0  (15)
where  = −

 is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour type



















7where e  = f  and  =  are the household ’s real optimized wage and real wage
index in the sector , respectively.
The nominal wage index in the sector  evolves over time according to the following recursive
equation:
()1− = (−1)1− +( 1− )(f )1− (17)
where f  is the average wage of those workers who are allowed to revise their wage at period  in






+( 1− )(e )1− (18)
In a symmetric equilibrium, e  = e  and  =  for all . Therefore, we can rewrite





















































In addition, Eqs. (16) and (18) permit us to derive the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve,
ˆ 





 [ˆ  − ˆ ],w h e r e

 = −1 is wage inﬂa t i o ni nt h es e c t o r
and hats over the variables denote deviations from steady-state values.
2.2 Final good
To facilitate the exposition of the production structure, we start from the ﬁnal stage of produc-
tion (explained in this section) and move through the intermediate phase to the initial stages of
production. Diagram 1 displays the production structure of the model.
At the last stage of production, a perfectly-competitive representative ﬁrm combines a com-
posite tradable good, , and non-tradable goods, , with corresponding prices  and ,


















8where  is the share of non-tradables in the ﬁnal good and 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between non-tradable and tradable goods.
Taking the price of the ﬁnal good, ,a sg i v e n ,t h eﬁnal good producer chooses  and 
to maximize its proﬁt. Formally:
max
{}
 −  − 
subject to (22). Proﬁt maximization implies the following demand functions for the aggregate
tradable good and the non-tradable good:











The zero-proﬁt condition implies that the ﬁnal-good price level, which we interpret as the








2.3 The non-tradable sector
Wholesale producers. The non-tradable good input used to produce  in (22) is generated
by a competitive wholesale ﬁrm that aggregates diﬀerentiated goods produced by a continuum of











where  is the demand for intermediate input  and 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution







subject to (25). The solution to this problem implies a demand function and a corresponding price,
















9Intermediate good producers. Each intermediate good ﬁrm  in sector  produces output,
, using capital, (=
R 1
0 ), labour, (=
R 1
0 ), and a commodity input,
 






¢   ∈ (01) (28)
where  +  +  =1 ; , ,a n d  are shares of capital, labour, and commodity inputs
in the production of non-tradable goods, respectively.  is a technology shock speciﬁct ot h e
non-tradable sector. It is assumed that this shock evolves exogenously according to:
log()=( 1− )log()+ log(−1)+
 (29)
where   0 is the steady-state value of ,  ∈ (−11) is an autoregressive coeﬃcient, and

 is uncorrelated and normally distributed innovation with zero mean and standard deviations
.
As in the wage-setting decisions of households, Calvo-Yun price rigidity applies: ﬁrm  is allowed
to revise its optimally chosen price, e , with probability (1 − ) for the period , and it fully
indexes its price to the steady-state CPI inﬂation rate, , otherwise. In that case, it will use the
non-optimal rule  = −1.T h eﬁrm chooses e , , ,a n d 
, to maximize


















and the (nominal) proﬁt function




where + is the nominal rental rate of capital in period  + , + is the nominal wage rate
in sector ; the nominal commodity price, ∗
, is determined exogenously in world markets and
denominated in U.S. dollars. The latter is multiplied by the nominal CAD/USD exchange rate, 
 ,
to yield the cost of commodity inputs in terms of domestic currency. The ﬁrm takes commodity
prices and the nominal exchange rate as given. Finally, + is the producer’s discount factor,
where + denotes the marginal utility of consumption in period  + .
9Which is obtained from equation (26) combined with the non-optimal pricing rule.
10The ﬁrst-order conditions (in real terms) with respect to , ,a n d 
 are:
 = ; (31)
 = ; (32)

 ∗
 =  
 (33)
where  is the real marginal cost in the non-tradable sector that is common to all intermediate
ﬁrms,  =  and  =  are real capital return and real wages in the non-
tradable sector. In addition, ∗
 = ∗





  represents the real CAD/USD exchange rate, where 
 is the U.S. price
level. The condition (33) indicates that the real marginal cost in the non-tradable sector is also
directly aﬀected by real exchange rate and commodity price movements, since commodities enter
the production of non-tradable goods as inputs.
The ﬁrm that is allowed to revise its price, which happens with probability (1 − ), chooses



















where e  = e  is the real optimized price in the non-tradable sector and  =  is
the relative price of non-tradable goods.







+( 1− )(e )
1−  (35)
2.4 Composite Tradable goods
Ar e p r e s e n t a t i v eﬁrm acting in a perfectly competitive market combines a domestically-produced
manufactured good,  
 with imports,  to produce an aggregate tradable good, . Hence-
forth, we refer to the latter simply as the tradable good. The aggregation technology is given by a




















where 0 is the elasticity of substitution between domestically-used manufactured and imported
goods in the production function and  denotes the shares of imported goods in the production
of the tradable good. The share  is time-varying and its evolution follows an exogenous AR(1)
process given by:
log()=( 1− )log()+ log(−1)+ (37)
11where   0 is the steady-state value of ,  ∈ (−11) is an autoregressive coeﬃcient, and
 is uncorrelated and normally distributed innovation with zero mean and standard deviations
. The time-varying share of foreign goods in the tradable goods aggregator, , is intended
to capture some exogenous factors aﬀecting the overall degree of “home bias” in the Canadian
economy. For instance, it captures factors related to globalization often associated with a decline
in various trade barriers, an increased variety of foreign goods available, or improvements in the
quality of these goods.
Given , , and the price of tradables, ,t h eﬁrm chooses  and  
 to maximize




 −  −  
 (38)
subject to (36). The following demand functions for domestically used manufacturing goods and























The production of inputs  and  
 used in the above equation (36) are explained in some
detail in next sections.
2.5 The manufacturing sector
As in the non-tradable sector, there are wholesale and intermediate-good producers in the man-
ufacturing sector. The competitive wholesale ﬁrm aggregates diﬀerentiated manufactured goods
produced by a continuum of manufactured intermediate-good producers which are indexed by










where ,a sd e ﬁned before, is the constant elasticity of substitution between the intermediate goods.
























The th intermediate-good-producing ﬁrm produces its output, , using capital (=
R 1
0 ), labour, (=
R 1
0 ), and the commodity input,  
. Its production






¢   ∈ (01) (43)
where  +  +  =1 ; ,  and  are the shares of capital, labour, and commodity
inputs in the production of manufactured goods, respectively.  is a technology shock speciﬁc
to the manufacturing sector, which evolves exogenously according to the AR(1) process:
log()=( 1− )log()+ log(−1)+
 (44)
where   0 is the steady-state value of ,  ∈ (−11) is an autoregressive coeﬃcient, and

 is uncorrelated and normally distributed innovation with zero mean and standard deviations
.
The nominal proﬁto fﬁrm  in period  + , +,i s :




Given the rental rate for capital in this sector, , the wage rate, ,a n d, the intermediate-
goods producer  thus chooses , ,a n d 
 to maximize its proﬁts. As in the non-
tradables sector, the Calvo-Yun probability of price revision is given by (1 − ) with the non-
optimized prices fully indexed to the steady-state CPI inﬂation rate. The price e  thus maximizes


















13The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to , ,a n d 
 (in real terms) are:
 = ; (46)
 = ; (47)

 ∗
 =  
 (48)
where  is the common real marginal cost in the manufacturing sector, and  =  and
 =  are deﬁned as in the non-tradable sector. In addition, the condition (48) has a
similar interpretation to its counterpart (33) for the non-tradables sector.



















where e  = e , is the real optimized price for domestic manufactured goods and  =
 is the sectoral relative price.







+( 1− )(e )
1−  (50)
The total domestic production of manufactured goods is divided into two parts:  
,f o r
domestic use in the production of tradable goods (see equation 36) and  
, which is exported, so
that  =  
+ 
. Following Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995), we assume producer currency pricing
(PCP) behavior in the manufacturing sector. Under this assumption, all ﬁrms set their price, e ,
for both home and foreign markets. Thus, the law of one price (LOP) holds and movements of the
exchange rate are completely passed through into export prices. The aggregate foreign demand













 is foreign output. The price-elasticity of demand for domestic manufactured-goods by
foreigners is −,a n d  0 is determines the sensitivity of domestic manufactured-goods exports
to foreign output. Since it is a small economy, domestic exports form an insigniﬁcant fraction of
foreign expenditures and have a negligible weight in the foreign price index.
It is assumed that foreign output is exogenous and evolves according to:
log( ∗
 )=( 1−  ∗)log( ∗)+ ∗ log( ∗
−1)+ ∗ (52)
where  ∗ is the steady-state value,  ∗ ∈ (−11) is an autoregressive coeﬃcient, and  ∗ is an
uncorrelated and normally distributed innovation with zero mean and standard deviation  ∗.
142.6 Import sector
There are both wholesale and intermediate-good ﬁr m si nt h i ss e c t o r . A continuum of importing
ﬁrms indexed by  ∈ [01] buy homogenous goods from two sources abroad, the U.S. and the
rest-of-the-world, costlessly combine these into  diﬀerentiated goods, , and sell them at price
 to a competitive wholesale ﬁrm. The latter then aggregates these diﬀerentiated intermediate










where ,a sd e ﬁned before, is the constant elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerentiated goods.























To sell  on the market, each intermediate-good importing ﬁrm  buys a fraction  of this
imported good in USD at the price 
 , and the remaining fraction, (1 − ), at the price 

(representing a basket of currencies). As in previous sectors, the Calvo-Yun probability of changing
price is (1 − ) with the non-optimized prices, fully indexed to the steady-state CPI inﬂation
rate. We deﬁne 
 as the bilateral nominal exchange rate between the rest of the world and the
United States, which is not aﬀected by the Canadian economy and treated as exogenous.10 Given
the nominal exchange rates 
 and 
 a n dt h ef o r e i g np r i c el e v e l s
 and 
 , the price e 

















where the nominal proﬁt function is:
+ =
n














15The presence of price rigidity means that the response of the imported goods price to exogenous
shocks is gradual, implying an incomplete pass-through of exchange rate changes to the levels of
prices in the economy. Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) ﬁnd evidence of incomplete exchange rate pass-
through in industrialized economies including Canada.








,s oi t sr e a l
marginal cost is equal to the weighted average real exchange rate, + = 
+
£




between the CAD/USD rate, 






The distinction among trade partners is potentially important for two reasons. First, there is the
pre-eminent role played by the Canada-U.S.bilateral exchange rate in the dynamics of the various
components of Canadian inﬂation, given the amount of trade between these two economies.11
Second, the distinction may help us capture certain relative price eﬀects due to the increasing
participation of emerging economies (e.g, China) in the world trade generally described within
the context of globalization. We assume that these eﬀects, unlike those pertaining to emerging
economies, impacted Canada and the U.S. − both members of the North-American Free-Trade
Agreement − roughly similarly so that real relative price of goods manufactured in the U.S. vis-à-
vis Canada would not have been aﬀected by this particular channel. We capture the latter changes
in real eﬀective prices by considering the exogenous stochastic process for 
+:12
log(
 )=( 1− )log()+ log(
−1)+ (57)
where   0 is the steady-state value of 
 ,  ∈ (−11) is an autoregressive coeﬃcient, and
 is uncorrelated and normally distributed innovation with zero mean and standard deviations
.



















where e  = e  is the real optimized price in import sector, and  =  is the relative







+( 1− )(e )
1−  (59)
11Currently Canada imports close to 80 per cent of all its foreign goods from the United States.
12The (exogenous) eﬀects of globalization that are not related to the relative prices of the rest-of-the-world vis-à-vis
both Canada and the U.S. are likely to be reﬂe c t e di nt h et i m e - v a r y i n gs h a r eo fi m p o r t e dg o o d si nt h ep r o d u c t i o no f
the tradeable good, , described in (37).
162.7 The commodity sector
The commodity sector is indexed by the subscript . Production in this sector is modelled to cap-
ture the importance of natural resources in the Canadian economy. In this sector, there is a perfectly
competitive ﬁrm that produces commodity output, , using capital, (=
R 1
0 ),l a b o u r ,
(=
R 1
0 ), and a natural-resource factor, . The presence of the natural resource factor
in the production of commodities prevents the small open economy from specializing in the pro-
duction of a single tradable good. In equilibrium, the commodity and manufactured goods sectors




   ∈ (01) (60)
with  + + =1 ,w h e r e, ,a n d are shares of capital, labour, and natural resources
in the production of commodities, respectively. The supply of  evolves exogenously according to
the following AR(1) process:
log()=( 1− )log()+ log(−1)+ (61)
where  is a steady-state value of ,  ∈ (−11) is an autoregressive coeﬃcient, and  is
uncorrelated and normally distributed innovation with zero mean and standard deviations .A
positive shock may be interpreted as an exogenous increase in the supply of the natural resource
factor due to, for example, favourable weather or a new mining discovery.
The commodity output is divided between exports and domestic use as direct inputs in the
manufacturing and non-tradable sectors, so that  =  
 +  
 +  
;w h e r e 
 is the
quantity of commodity goods exported, while  
 and  
 denote the quantities of commodity
goods used as material inputs in the manufacturing and non-tradable sectors, respectively.
The commodity-producing ﬁrm takes the nominal commodity price, ∗
, and the nominal
CAD/USD exchange rate, 
 , as given. Thus, given 
 , ∗
, ,  and the price of
the natural-resource factor, , the commodity-producing ﬁrm chooses ,  and  to






 −  −  − 
¤

subject to the production technology, Eq. (60).










17where  = ,  = ,a n d =  are real capital returns, real wages, and
real natural resource prices in the commodity sector, respectively.
The demand for , ,a n d are given by equations. (62)— (64), respectively. These
equations stipulate that the marginal cost of each input must be equal to its marginal productivity.
Because the economy is small, the demand for commodity exports and their prices are completely
determined in the world markets. It is assumed that real commodity price, ∗
, evolves exogenously






  0 is the steady-state value of the real commodity price,  ∈ (−11) is an autoregres-
sive coeﬃcient, and  is uncorrelated and normally distributed innovation with zero mean and
standard deviations . As long as the small economy is a net commodity exporter, a positive
shock to ∗
 is a favourable shock to its terms of trade.
2.8 Government
It is assumed that government’s revenues include lump-sum taxes, Υ, and newly issued debt,
. The government uses its revenues to ﬁnance its spending,  and repay its debt, −1.
The government’s budget is given by
 + −1 = Υ +  (66)
Government spending evolves exogenously according to the following process
log()=( 1− )log()+ log(−1)+ (67)
where  is the steady-state value ,  ∈ (−11) is an autoregressive coeﬃcient, and  is an
uncorrelated and normally distributed innovation with zero mean and standard deviations .
2.9 Current account
Combining the household’s budget constraint, government budget, and single-period proﬁt func-
tions of commodity producing ﬁrm, manufactured and non-tradable goods producing ﬁrms, and














 −  








 − [ +( 1− )
 ] (68)
182.10 Monetary authority
We assume that the monetary authority uses the short-term nominal interest rate, ,a si t si n -





















where R, ,a n dY are the steady-state values of , ,a n d. Parameter  captures interest-rate
smoothing while  and  are the policy coeﬃcients measuring the central bank’s responses to
deviations of inﬂation, , and output, , from their steady-state values, respectively. It is further
assumed that the error term  is a serially uncorrelated and normally distributed monetary policy
shock with zero mean and standard deviations . N o t et h a tw h i l et h ea b o v ep o l i c yr e a c t i o n
function is written in terms of CPI inﬂation, , one of the objectives of this paper is precisely to
determine whether this particular inﬂation rate is indeed the right rate to use. We shall modify this
reaction function appropriately (in section 4) given our objective of determining the best inﬂation
rate to target.
2.11 Symmetric equilibrium
In equilibrium, the ﬁnal good is divided between consumption, , private investment in the three
production sectors, , and government spending, ,s ot h a t = ++,w i t h = ++
. We consider a symmetric equilibrium, in which all households, intermediate goods-producing
ﬁrms, and importers make identical decisions. Therefore,  = ,  = ,  = , ∗
 = ∗
,
 = , e  = e ,  =  = ,  =  = ,  
 =  
,  
 =  
,
 = ,a n de  = e , for all  ∈ [01],  ∈ [01],  = . Furthermore, the market-
clearing conditions  = Υ and  =0must hold for all  ≥ 0. In addition, since e  = e  and



























with  = .13
Finally, note that the manufacturing and non-tradable sectors use commodity goods as material
inputs in production of  and ,w h i c ha r ed e ﬁned as gross output. The value-added output
13When log-linearizing the three sets of two equations formed by (34) and (35), (49) and (50), and (58) and (59)




for  = , where hats over the variables denote deviations from their steady-state values.
19in each sector,  
 and  
, can be constructed by subtracting commodity inputs as follow:
 
 =  − 
 ∗
 
 for  =  Hence, aggregate GDP is deﬁned as:
 =  




3 Calibration and estimation
We use the Dynare program and Canadian data, at a quarterly frequency, extending from 1981Q1
to 2007Q2, to estimate the non-calibrated structural parameters. Output in the commodity sector
is measured by the total real production in primary industries (agriculture, ﬁshing, forestry, and
mining) and resource processing, which includes pulp and paper, wood products, primary metals,
and petroleum and coal reﬁning. The output of non-tradables includes construction, transportation
and storage, communications, insurance, ﬁnance, real estate, community and personal services,
and utilities. The manufactured goods are measured by the total real production in diﬀerent
manufacturing sectors in the Canadian economy. Real commodity prices are measured by deﬂating
the nominal commodity prices (including energy and non-energy commodities) by the U.S. GDP
deﬂator. The nominal interest rate is measured by the rate on Canadian three-month treasury
bills. Government spending is measured by total real government purchases of goods and services.
The real exchange rate is measured by multiplying the nominal USD/CAN exchange rate by the
ratio of U.S. to Canadian prices. Foreign inﬂation is measured by changes in the U.S. GDP implicit
price deﬂator. Foreign output is measured by U.S. real GDP per capita. The series of commodities,
manufactured goods, non-tradables, and government spending are expressed in real terms and per
capita using the Canadian population aged 15 and over. Finally, we obtain import and exchange
rate data from the IFS from which we construct the US eﬀective exchange rate.
We focus on the estimation of key sector-speciﬁc and monetary policy-related parameters, and
calibrate the rest to capture salient features of the Canadian economy, given that some of the
parameters are poorly-identiﬁable. Many of these values are taken from Dib (2008) and are fairly
standard in the existing literature.14 Table 1 displays steady-state values of selected variables used
in the calibration and Table 2 reports the values of the calibrated parameters.
The discount factor, , is set at 0.991, which implies an annual steady-state real interest rate
of 4% that matches the average observed in the estimation sample. The curvature parameter in
the utility function, , is given a value of 2, implying an elasticity of intertemporal substitution
of 0.5. Following Bouakez et al. (2009), we set both  and , the labour elasticity of substitution
across sectors and the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of labour, at unity.
The capital depreciation rate, , is assigned a value of 0.025; this value is commonly used in the
l i t e r a t u r ea n da s s u m e dt oa p p l yt o the three production sectors.
14See also Dib (2006).
20The shares of capital, labour, and natural resources in the production of commodities, , ,
and  are assigned values of 0.41, 0.39, and 0.2, respectively. The shares of capital, labour, and
commodity inputs in production of manufactured (non-tradable) goods,  (),  (), and
 () are set equal to 0.26 (0.28), 0.63 (0.66), and 0.11 (0.06), respectively. All these shares are
taken from Macklem et al. (2000) who calculated these from Canadian 1996 input-output tables.15
The parameter , which measures the degree of monopoly power in intermediate-goods markets,
is set equal to 6, implying a steady-state price markup of 20%. Parameter, , which measures the
degree of monopoly power in labour markets, is set equal to 10. Parameter , which captures the
price-elasticity of demand for imports and domestic goods (and it is also the elasticity of substitution
between imports, manufactured and non-tradable goods in the ﬁnal good), is set equal to 0.6. The
parameter  is a normalization that ensures the ratio of manufactured exports to GDP is equal
to the one observed in the data, and is, therefore, set to 0.21. Parameters  and ,w h i c ha r e
associated with the shares of imports and non-tradable goods in the ﬁnal good, are calibrated to
match the average ratios observed in the data for the estimation period. We set these equal to 0.50,
and 0.60, respectively.
In addition, households are assumed to allocate, on average, one third of their available time
to market activities. Therefore, the steady-state hours worked, , ,a n d,a r es e te q u a lt o
0.07, 0.21, and 0.05, respectively. The steady-state stock of natural resources, , and of technology
levels in manufacturing and non-tradable sectors,  and , are assigned values to match the
ratios of commodity, manufactured, and non-tradable goods in Canadian GDP. Finally, the steady-
state level of the exogenous variables ∗
 and  ∗ are set equal to unity.
The remaining parameters are estimated using Bayesian procedures as in Smets and Wouters
(2007). Prior distributions are conjectured for the various parameters and that provide starting
points for the optimization algorithm. Tables 3, 4, and 5 report the estimation outcomes, as well
as the prior distributions assumed for the estimated parameters.
The estimation shows that, consistent with what we expected to ﬁnd, prices and wages are
stickiest in the non-tradable sector. Furthermore, capital adjustment costs in this sector are also
the highest. In contrast, price stickiness is lower in manufacturing, and both capital adjustment
costs and wage stickiness in the commodity sector are also estimated to be relatively lower.
We also ﬁnd that technology shocks, particularly in the non-tradable sector, are quite persistent,
and that both U.S./rest of the world real exchange rate and government spending shocks exhibit a
fair bit of sluggishness as well. Foreign shocks, in contrast, are estimated to have smaller autore-
gressive coeﬃcient values, and the estimated parameters of the monetary policy reaction function
have values that put a bigger weight on inﬂation than on output, reﬂecting similar ﬁndings in
15Macklem et al. (2000) have obtained these shares from 1996 current-dollar input-output tables at the medium
level of aggregation, which disaggregates input-output tables into 50 industries and 50 goods.
21other studies for Canada. As for the standard deviations, we ﬁnd the supply of natural resource
and the commodity price to have the two highest estimated values, followed by manufacturing
and government spending. In contrast, the volatilities of non-tradable goods and of the various
foreign variables are estimated to be considerably lower. Interestingly, the standard deviation of
the exogenous shock to the import share is estimated to be relatively important, with a value of
0024.
3.1 Variance decompositions
In order to gauge the extent to which the diﬀerent shocks in our model aﬀect variables of interest,
we proceed with a variance decomposition for these shocks and report the outcomes in Table 6.
From this table, it is quite apparent that technology shocks, and, in particular, the technology
shock impacting the non-tradable sector, , are the principal drivers of the movements in most
of the considered variables. In particular,  explains 66 per cent and 81 per cent of movements
in the inﬂation rate and output of the manufacturing sector, respectively, as well as 14 per cent
and 30 per cent of the corresponding variables in the tradables sector. On the other hand, apart
from explaining big shares of the changes in variables in the non-tradable sector,  explains 68
per cent of consumption, 70 p e rc e n to fG D P ,a n d48 per cent of CPI inﬂation.
The other interesting fact that can be observed from the table is that the shock to import share
 also explains a substantial portion of movements in key variables. In particular, in addition to






,a n d30 per cent of the output of tradables, it also explains 18 per
cent of interest rate movements, and 34 per cent of CPI inﬂation. Interestingly, we found that
shutting down these two shocks resulted in technology shocks taking on their explanatory role. In
contrast, the shock to competitivity, as characterized by , turns out to have very little role in
explaining ﬂuctuations on our variables of interest. One possible reason for why this shock is not
instrumental is that we ﬁx , the parameter in equation (68). Allowing this parameter to ﬂuctuate
endogenously is likely to make this shock more eﬀective.
4 Welfare analysis
We solve the model to a second-order approximation around its deterministic steady-state to analyze
and compare the welfare implications of alternative optimized monetary policy reaction functions.16
The alternative “rules” diﬀer with respect to the sectoral price index or inﬂation rate targeted by
the monetary authority. For  = , we consider the following reaction functions
16We use the Dynare program, which relies on Sims’ (2002) algorithm, to ﬁrst obtain the model’s solution to a
second-order approximation around its deterministic steady state and, then, to calculate the theoretical ﬁrst and
second moments of the endogenous variables, including period utility. See Juillard (2002).
22that feature inﬂation or price level-targeting:































where e  =  e −1 and policy alternatives indexed by  =  refer to the agregate price
level, .
The procedure to conduct the welfare analysis is similar to the one used in Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2004) and Ambler et al. (2004). First, we compute a reference welfare measure as the
unconditional expectation of lifetime utility in the deterministic steady state, in which all shocks
are set to zero and there is no uncertainty. This measure is convenient for welfare comparisons
because the deterministic steady-state is invariant across all policy regimes considered. Then,
using the deterministic steady-state as the initial state, we run stochastic simulations of the model
and compute the conditional expectation of lifetime utility under the diﬀerent alternative policy
reaction functions. Finally, we rank the alternative policies according to their welfare losses relative
to the reference welfare measure.
To compute the welfare losses associated with a particular policy rule, we use the compensating
variation in consumption. This measures the percentage change in consumption at the deterministic
steady state that would give households the same conditional expected utility in the stochastic
economy. Because the model is solved using a second-order approximation, the variance of the
shocks aﬀects the means and the variances of the endogenous variables in the stochastic equilibrium.
The latter implies a permanent shift in the stochastic steady state level of consumption.
We can decompose the total welfare eﬀect into level and variance eﬀects, as follows. We ﬁrst
calculate a second-order Taylor expansion of the single-period utility function (1) around the de-
terministic steady-state values  and :
 ( ) ≈  ()+Λ
³









1+ is the utility at the steady-state, and b  and b  are the log-
deviations of  and  from their deterministic steady state values. Functions Λ
³
b  b 
´
≡
1−(b )−1+( b ) and Λ
³







 ) are convenient to compute the
eﬀects of the variance of the shocks on the mean and the variance of the endogenous variables,
respectively.
Second, let  ((1 + )) be the utilty derived by the household when a permanent shift
in steady state of consumption is originated from the level (mean) eﬀect. The level eﬀect, ,i s
the percent increase in steady-state consumption, , that makes the household as well-oﬀ under
23an alternative policy rule as under the reference measure given by the new steady-state. From
 ((1 + ))= ()+Λ
³
b  b 
´
,  is solved as:
 =
∙
1+( 1− )(b ) − (1 − )
1+




Similarly, let  denote the variance eﬀect, which is the solution for  ((1 + ))=
 () − Λ
³


















Third, for each alternative optimized policy regime, we use the parameter values from the
calibration and estimation procedures, with the exception of the parameters in the monetary policy
reaction function, for which we conduct a grid-search and select the combination of parameters
that imply the lowest welfare loss relative to the reference (deterministic steady-state) welfare
measure. For the smoothing coeﬃcient, , we consider three cases: zero inertia ( =0 ) ,h i s t o r i c a l
inertia (based on the estimated parameter value,  =0 6754), and high inertia ( ≈ 1).F o rt h e




,w ec o n s i d e ra n
equally-spaced grid in the [06] interval with incremental step equal to 005. This numeric approach
follows Kollmann (2002), Ambler et al. (2004), Bergin et al. (2007), and Schmidt-Grohe-Uribe
(2007).
Table 7 displays the results of the welfare comparisons. We consider the following alternative
policy reaction functions (hereafter refered to as rules for simplicity): (1) the historical rule, which
is the one using the estimated/calibrated coeﬃcients discussed in Tables 1-5, (2) the ﬁve inﬂation-
targeting rules, in which the monetary policy reacts to the CPI inﬂation or to sectoral inﬂation rates
(non-tradable, tradable, manufacturing, and imported goods), and (3) three price level-target rules




used in the (optimized) monetary policy rule for each alternative; Columns 4-7 display the average
levels of consumption, hours-worked, GDP, and the lifetime utility of households obtained from a
stochastic simulation of the model; Columns 8-10 show the welfare gains measured as percentage
of the deterministic steady-state consumption, decomposed into the gains due to the change in the
average levels and variances of consumption and hours-worked. For convenience, we include (second
row) the results for the case of ﬂexible prices and wages under a strict CPI inﬂation targeting rule,
as well as the deterministic steady state levels of key variables, including welfare (bottom row).
Note that the two dominant options among optimized rules are the targeting of the CPI level
or inﬂation.17 Targeting the price level or the inﬂation rate in the non-tradables sector is the best
17A complementary study to ours is that of Shukayev and Ueberfeldt (2010). Rather than focusing on sectoral
inﬂation rates, they examine the welfare implications of targeting alternatively weighted CPI baskets for Canada
24option among the alternatives involving only sectoral indices. Thus, abstracting from the economy-
wide price index (i.e., the CPI), the results in Table 7 are consistent with results by Aoki (2001)
and Benigno (2004) whereby a higher weight should be attached to the inﬂation rate in sectors
with high degrees of nominal rigidities. In those studies the welfare losses are associated with the
suboptimal output produced by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms facing nominal rigidities. If
we consider an economy hit by shocks that have asymmetric eﬀects across sectors, the monetary
policy can inﬂuence the cross-sector allocation of resources by targeting a sectoral price index. In
the absence of factor mobility costs, welfare losses due to nominal rigidities prevail. However, when
it is costly to move resources across sectors, this second source of welfare losses must also be added
to the eﬀect of suboptimal output and of price dispersion.
Although not the main focus of this paper, Table 7 also provides some implications for a
comparison between reacting to the alternatives based on the inﬂation rate versus those based on
corresponding price levels. In particular, it shows that the optimized rules based on the reaction of
the monetary authority to the CPI inﬂation rate and to the CPI level are virtually equivalent from
a welfare perspective. This result can partly be explained by the fact that the optimized value for
the smoothing parameter in the CPI-inﬂation-based rule is equal to the historical value (which is
relatively high at approximately 068), whereas the optimized rule based on the CPI level shows no
inertial behaviour. Because of the important inertia in the inﬂation-based rule, actions in the past
matter for the current period and bygones are therefore not full bygones. As a result, the coeﬃcient
on the CPI inﬂation rate in the optimized rule is higher (at 2.45) than the coeﬃcient on the CPI
inﬂation level in the corresponding rule (at 1.10). Finally, we note that the welfare-maximizing
ordering of the rules with various inﬂation rates is maintained for the corresponding level-based
rules, thus emphasizing again the roles of the real and nominal rigidities discussed above.
Table 8, which displays the simulated second moments of selected variables under the alternative
optimized rules, helps us understand the main results. Observe that targeting the inﬂation or the
price level in the non-tradable sector reduces inﬂation volatilty in that sector but induces more
volatility in the inﬂation rates of other sectors. That means additional volatility in relative prices.
Compared to the rules that target the CPI, the volatilities of consumption, exchange rate, output,
CPI inﬂation, and even non-tradable output are higher under rules that target the non-tradable
inﬂation or price level. Since the economy seems to be less volatile in the case of rules that target
an economy-wide index, rather that a sectoral index, more resources are lost in the transfer of
production factors across sectors in the latter case.
within a diﬀerent framework. They conclude that using the current CPI weights in the monetary policy reaction
fucntion is nearly optimal, which is consistent with our results.
254.1 Impulse response analysis
Next, we examine the dynamic impact of some of the model’s shocks under alternative monetary
policy rules that diﬀer with respect to the targeted inﬂation rate, including the estimated historical
rule. Figures 1 to 5 display the impulse responses (in percent deviation from steady state) of selected
variables. Figure 1 shows the quarterly responses to a one percent increase in the manufacturing-
related technology shock, . With a few exceptions, responses are qualitatively similar whichever
inﬂation rate is targeted in the policy rule, though quantitatively, there are important diﬀerences
for some variables.
Regardless of the monetary policy rule, a shock to  produces an immediate increase in
manufacturing output and a concurrent decline in prices in that sector. In all cases, the monetary
authority will cut interest rates in response to the fall in the relevant inﬂation being targeted.
The eﬀects on the remaining sectors’ output will depend on the overall wealth eﬀect generated
by the increase in manufacturing output vis-a-vis the substitution eﬀect induced by the cheaper
traded goods. With the exception of total output in the importing sector, , under the cases
of -targeting and -targeting rules, the demand-driven output in all sectors increases, which
explains the increase in inﬂation in the other sectors than manufacturing. The only exception is
 in the case of the estimated historical rule. In all cases, total output increases. Since part of
the manufacturing output is exported, the increase in exports will require a depreciation of the real
CAD/USD exchange rate to accomodate the higher level of exports and increase in the current
account. The decline in interest rates, a reaction to the fall in inﬂation, also contributes to the
depreciation of the real CAD/USD exchange rate.
Note that under a monetary policy rule targeting manufacturing-price inﬂation, the policy rate
responds more sharply to accommodate the shock that occurs in that very sector. As the monetary
authority does not care about other sectors’ inﬂation rates, their increase dominates the fall in 
and the overall CPI inﬂation increases.
If, on the other hand, policy were targeting inﬂation in the non-tradables’ sector, the positive
technology shock to the manufacturing sector would result in an increase in manufacturing output,
but would not lead to important changes in demand for non-tradables or its prices, with a very
subdued policy reaction. Manufacturing goods being cheaper compared to imports, and the income
eﬀect not being strong enough, import demand would somewhat decline, so that there would be
practically no change in the exchange rate. Accordingly, we would witness a very modest increase
in consumption and output.
Finally, we see that with CPI inﬂation-targeting, responses would quantatively lie between their
corresponding levels for the above two policy scenarios. That is, total output and consumption
would increase a little, the exchange rate would somewhat depreciate, the policy rate would be
reduced but by less than half its increase under the manufacturing-price inﬂation-targeting case,
26and headline inﬂation would decline just a small amount and for a short time.
Figure 2 shows the responses of variables to a one percent technology shock in the non-tradables
sector. Given the high price stickiness in this sector, targeting the non-tadable goods’ inﬂation rate
produces subtantially bigger eﬀects than would have been produced under any other inﬂation
targeting rule. In particular, output of non-tradables jumps quite high immediately and remains
robust for a long while. The substitution eﬀect between tradables and non-tradables is weaker than
the generated wealth eﬀect, and manufacturing output also rises in the short run. Consumption
and total output subsequently increase, remaining at fairly high levels for a considerable amount
of time. Inﬂation rates in all but the non-tradable sector also increase in the short run. However,
the decline in  dominates and CPI inﬂation falls, triggering an interest rate cut, except in the
case of CPI-inﬂation targeting, when it increases in reponse to a (slight) increase in total inﬂation.
The wealth eﬀect also causes imports to rise, and the increase in the price of tradables relative to
that of non-tradables amounts to a depreciation in the exchange rate.
We now turn to the eﬀect of an unexpected increase in the share of imports in tradables. Figure
3 shows the responses of various macroeconomic variables to a positive shock in this share (for ex-
ample, following a change in quota). We see that the increase in imports crowds out manufacturing
demand and output in the latter sector declines, except under the historical rule which increases,
but only on impact. Inﬂation in that sector, also declines (except for the case where monetary pol-
icy targets ), while import price inﬂation rises accompanied by a depreciation of the exchange
rate. The net eﬀect on the tradable goods sector is an increase in output and a decline in prices.
Given the complementary nature of tradable and non-tradable goods, output is somewhat also
driven up in the latter sector. As a result, overall output rises while overall inﬂation falls, leading
in a temporary increase in consumption in the domestic economy.
Interestingly, a shock to import price results in a somewhat diﬀerent dynamics for the variables
of interest. Figure 4 shows the eﬀect of a negative one percent price shock on these variables.
We ﬁr s tn o t et h a ti m p o r t si m m e d i ately increase while the inﬂation rate in that sector falls. The
resulting income eﬀect is usually strong enough that it dominates the sustitution eﬀect between
domestically-manufactured and imported goods, except for the -targeting and -targeting
cases. Thus, manufacturing output also increases, helping to also raise output in non-tradables.
Regardless of the targeted inﬂation rate in the policy rule, overall output increases, followed by a
similar increase in consumption. The decline in import prices is enough to generate even a small
decline in overall inﬂation in the domestic economy, except when the targeted inﬂa t i o ni nt h ep o l i c y
rule is that of import prices that is deliberately countered by a substantial decline in interest rates.
Finally, Figure 5 displays how the asymmetric eﬀects of monetary policy change depending on
the diﬀerent policy rules considered.
274.2 The role of factor mobility costs
To test our conjecture that costly resource realocation produces welfare losses that ultimately
determine the choice of CPI inﬂation as the best option to target, we shut down the factor mobility
costs in the model and conduct the same welfare analysis exercise as above. First, we consider
a case with no labour mobillity costs ( →∞ ) and equal capital adjustment costs across sectors ³




. Second, we also shut down all sectoral capital adjustment costs
( =  =  ≈ 0). The results shown in Table 9 indicate that the optimal CPI inﬂation rule
still gives a higher welfare than the optimal non-tradable inﬂation rule when only labour is perfect
mobile across sectors (case 1), but the reverse result prevails when all costs, including capital
adjustment costs, are set to zero (case 2). As the non-tradable sector has the highest share in
Canadian output and reveals the highest degree of nominal and real rigidities, for the targeting of
the non-tradable inﬂation to be the best choice it suﬃces to set the adjustment cost of capital in
that sector to zero (case 3).
From the above panels, we can conclude that capital mobility costs play an important role in
the choice of the best inﬂation rate to include in the reaction function. To explore this issue in
more detail, we conduct a set of additional experiments. Figures 6 and 7 show the comparisons
between impulse responses of key variables to the two technology shocks for the case of CPI-
inﬂation targeting with and without capital adjustment costs in the non-tradable sector. Notice
that, for inovations in both types of technology shocks, setting  =0generally implies a stronger
response of output and inﬂation and a weaker response of consumption, relative to the baseline
case. Since non-tradable output represents a large share (60%) of the ﬁnal good aggregator, when
capital adjustment costs are shut down in this sector, aggregate investment becomes more volatile
inducing higher volatility in the return on capital. The increased volatility of capital revenue
earned by the households translates into more uncertainty in their total income. In turn, this
induces precautionary savings and, thus, less consumption. From Table 9, also observe that the
dampening eﬀect of the higher income volatility on the level of consumption explains most of the
positive diﬀerence in welfare between targeting inﬂation in the baseline case relative to case 3,
for which the best option becomes reacting to the inﬂation of non-tradable goods. This shows
that factor mobility costs, specially in the form of sector-speciﬁc capital adjustment costs, play a
paramount role in the choice of the welfare maximizing monetary policy rule.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper proposed and estimated a structural multi-sector small open economy model for Canada
to study whether targeting the CPI inﬂation rate, as many central banks around the world do, is
the best option compared to targeting other inﬂation rates. We focused in particular on (i) the
28role of sector-speciﬁc real rigidities, specially in the form of factor mobility costs, and (ii) welfare
implications of targeting alternative price indices having estimated key parameter values with data
from Canada, a well-established inﬂation-targeting economy. The model features multiple sectors
that allow for heterogeneity along three dimentions: price- and wage-rigidities, capital adjustment
costs, and idiosyncratic technology shocks. Our estimations showed considerable heterogeneity
across sectors. Comparing welfare implications of alternative monetary policy rules, where these
diﬀer with respect to the price index or the inﬂation rate targeted by the monetary authority, we
found that maximal welfare is achieved by targeting CPI level or inﬂation. Capital mobility costs
matter importantly in this regard, since shutting down these costs generates a diﬀerent optimal
targeting choice for the monetary authority.
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Variable Deﬁnition Values
 gross domestic nominal rate 1.0185
 gross domestic inﬂation rate 1.0085
∗ gross foreign nominal interest rate 1.0158
∗ gross foreign inﬂation rate 1.0070
 labour supply in commodity sector 0.05
 labour supply in manufacturing sector 0.07
 labour supply in nontradable sector 0.21
 supply of natural resources 0.1
 ∗ world output 1.0
 manufacturing sector total factor productivity 1.0
 non-tradable sector total factor productivity 1.0
Table 2: Calibration
Parameters Deﬁnition Values
 discount factor 0.991
 inverse intertemporal elasticity of consumption 2
 inverse labour elasticity of substitution across sectors 1
 intertemporal elasticity of labour 1
 capital depreciation rate 0.025
 share of capital in commodity output 0.41
 share of labour in commodity output 0.39
 share of natural resources in commodity output 0.20
 share of capital in manufactured goods 0.26
 share of labour in manufactured goods 0.63
 share of commodity inputs in manufactured goods 0.11
 share of capital in non-tradable goods 0.28
 share of labour in non-tradable goods 0.66
 share of commodity inputs in non-tradable goods 0.06
 share of imports in the tradable goods at the steady state 0.50
 share of non-tradables in the ﬁnal goods 0.60
 share of imports from the US in total imports 0.62
 intermediate-goods elasticity of substitution 6
 elasticity of substitution within each sector’s labour aggregator 10
 elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods 0.6
 elasticity of substitution between domestically-manufactured and foreign goods 1.2
 constant associated with risk premium 0.0115
 constant associated with the share of exports in home GDP 0.21
33Table 3: Results from Posterior Maximization - Structural Parameters
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Parameter Density Mean Std Dev Mode 95% Conf. Interval
 mon. policy, smoothing beta 0.60 0.06 0.68 [0.59, 0.72]
 mon. policy, inﬂation gamma 0.50 0.05 0.67 [0.62, 0.80]
 mon. policy, output normal 0.10 0.01 0.06 [0.04, 0.08]
 Calvo price, manufacturing beta 0.67 0.05 0.45 [0.40, 0.51]
 Calvo price, nontradables beta 0.67 0.05 0.85 [0.79, 0.92]
 Calvo price, imports beta 0.67 0.05 0.59 [0.53, 0.65]
 Calvo wage, manufacturing beta 0.67 0.05 0.59 [0.49, 0.68]
 Calvo wage, nontradables beta 0.67 0.05 0.68 [0.62, 0.73]
 Calvo wage, commodity beta 0.67 0.05 0.49 [0.41, 0.55]
  adj. cost, manufacturing gamma 15.0 5.00 17.8 [12.2, 22.7]
  adj. cost, nontradables gamma 15.0 5.00 24.5 [18.1, 29.6]
  adj. cost, commodity gamma 15.0 5.00 16.6 [11.5, 21.4]
Table 4: Results from Posterior Maximization - AR(1) Coeﬃcients of shocks
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Parameter Density Mean Mode 95% Conf. Interval
 technology, manufacturing beta 0.80 0.72 [0.65, 0.79]
 technology, non-tradables beta 0.80 0.96 [0.95, 0.97]
 government spending beta 0.80 0.84 [0.81, 0.87]
∗ foreign interest rate beta 0.60 0.61 [0.58, 0.64]
 ∗ foreign output beta 0.60 0.63 [0.58, 0.70]
∗ foreign inﬂation beta 0.60 0.63 [0.61, 0.66]
 commodity price beta 0.60 0.76 [0.69 0.82]
 natural resources beta 0.60 0.64 [0.52, 0.74]
 rest of the world REER beta 0.80 0.84 [0.76, 0.92]
 import share beta 0.80 0.80 [0.75, 0.85]
Table 5: Results from Posterior Maximization - Standard Deviations of Shocks
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Parameter Density Mean Mode 95% Conf. Interval
 tech., manufacturing inv. gamma 0.01 0.022 [0.008, 0.026]
 tech., nontradables inv. gamma 0.01 0.029 [0.027, 0.031]
 gov’t spending inv. gamma 0.01 0.030 [0.025, 0.032]
 mon. policy inv. gamma 0.01 0.003 [0.001, 0.005]
∗ foreign interest rate inv. gamma 0.01 0.065 [0.008, 0.011]
 ∗ foreign output inv. gamma 0.01 0.062 [0.006, 0.013]
∗ foreign inﬂation inv. gamma 0.01 0.003 [0.002, 0.004]
 commodity price inv. gamma 0.01 0.043 [0.039, 0.049]
 natural resources inv. gamma 0.01 0.076 [0.068, 0.087]
 rest of the world REER inv. gamma 0.01 0.012 [0.011, 0.014]
 import share inv. gamma 0.01 0.024 [0.019, 0.027]






C 5.6 68.3 17.7 1.5 0.1 1.4 1.5 0.1 0.0 3.7 0.1
H 0.9 81.9 12.6 1.2 0.0 2.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0
S
us 2.1 50.1 2.0 11.8 0.6 2.4 20.9 1.4 0.2 8.7 0.1
Y 8 . 7 7 0 . 19 . 15 . 70 . 92 . 70 . 70 . 10 . 01 . 80 . 1
R 8 . 6 5 8 . 30 . 20 . 20 . 08 . 15 . 80 . 40 . 0 1 8 . 10 . 2
π 10.6 47.5 1.1 0.2 0.1 1.9 4.2 0.3 0.0 34.0 0.2
π N 3 . 8 9 1 . 01 . 10 . 10 . 00 . 70 . 80 . 00 . 02 . 50 . 1
π T 13.7 16.3 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.8 6.5 0.4 0.0 60.0 0.3
π M 66.0 19.8 0.5 0.8 0.1 2.3 3.3 0.2 0.1 6.7 0.0
π F 4 . 7 4 4 . 11 . 55 . 90 . 44 . 6 3 0 . 92 . 00 . 13 . 12 . 8
Z 5.4 67.6 15.7 0.8 0.1 2.4 2.2 0.1 0.0 5.7 0.1
Y N 0 . 5 8 7 . 18 . 70 . 30 . 02 . 00 . 50 . 00 . 00 . 90 . 0
Y T 30.1 8.1 19.2 5.0 0.4 1.3 7.4 0.4 0.1 27.4 0.6
Y M 8 0 . 70 . 73 . 04 . 10 . 10 . 71 . 50 . 10 . 29 . 00 . 0
Y M 5 2 . 91 . 15 . 00 . 70 . 00 . 30 . 50 . 00 . 1 3 9 . 40 . 0
Y M 64.0 1.2 1.2 9.5 0.3 0.8 11.8 0.8 1.7 8.7 0.0
Y F 5.6 8.4 13.5 14.2 0.8 1.1 10.0 0.6 0.3 43.6 2.0




35Ct H t Y t ut Level Variance Total
Y t πt
Historical rule 0.061 0.672 0.4377 0.2293 0.7083 -2.3128 -0.63 -0.09 -0.72
Flex-Prices 0.000 6.000 0.4406 0.2274 0.7111 -2.2989 0.02 -0.14 -0.11
CPI Inflation Targeting
No inertia: 0.000 6.000 0.4402 0.2287 0.7115 -2.3007 -0.07 -0.13 -0.19
Hist. inertia: 0.000 2.450 0.4404 0.2286 0.7116 -2.2998 -0.03 -0.12 -0.15
High inertia: 0.000 1.950 0.4403 0.2287 0.7117 -2.2999 -0.04 -0.12 -0.16
Nontradable Inflation Targeting
No inertia: 0.000 4.200 0.4398 0.2288 0.7115 -2.3037 -0.17 -0.16 -0.33
Hist. inertia: 0.000 1.250 0.4400 0.2286 0.7115 -2.3024 -0.12 -0.15 -0.27
High inertia: 0.050 1.175 0.4400 0.2284 0.7115 -2.3019 -0.10 -0.14 -0.25
Imported Goods Inflation Targeting
No inertia: 0.025 6.000 0.4384 0.2294 0.7088 -2.3096 -0.49 -0.09 -0.58
Hist. inertia: 0.000 2.350 0.4384 0.2293 0.7089 -2.3092 -0.48 -0.08 -0.56
High inertia: 0.000 1.525 0.4384 0.2293 0.7089 -2.3090 -0.47 -0.08 -0.56
Tradable Inflation Targeting
No inertia: 0.100 5.725 0.4380 0.2304 0.7092 -2.3125 -0.58 -0.13 -0.71
Hist. inertia: 0.000 1.475 0.4384 0.2300 0.7093 -2.3100 -0.50 -0.10 -0.60
High inertia: 0.025 0.900 0.4384 0.2300 0.7093 -2.3097 -0.49 -0.10 -0.59
Manufacturing Inflation Targeting
No inertia: 0.075 4.075 0.4375 0.2305 0.7083 -2.3151 -0.71 -0.11 -0.82
Hist. inertia: 0.000 0.950 0.4376 0.2303 0.7083 -2.3139 -0.67 -0.10 -0.77
High inertia: 0.025 0.625 0.4376 0.2303 0.7083 -2.3141 -0.68 -0.10 -0.78
Consumer Price Level Targeting
No inertia: 0.000 1.100 0.4403 0.2285 0.7115 -2.2998 -0.04 -0.11 -0.15
Hist. inertia: 0.000 0.575 0.4403 0.2286 0.7115 -2.3000 -0.05 -0.11 -0.16
High inertia: 0.000 0.625 0.4402 0.2289 0.7115 -2.3006 -0.07 -0.12 -0.19
Nontradable Price Level Targeting
No inertia: 0.075 1.100 0.4402 0.2284 0.7116 -2.3013 -0.08 -0.14 -0.22
Hist. inertia: 0.100 0.450 0.4402 0.2282 0.7114 -2.3008 -0.07 -0.13 -0.20
High inertia: 0.175 0.700 0.4401 0.2282 0.7112 -2.3014 -0.10 -0.13 -0.22
Tradable Price Level Targeting
No inertia: 0.000 1.025 0.4385 0.2300 0.7094 -2.3096 -0.48 -0.10 -0.58
Hist. inertia: 0.000 0.350 0.4384 0.2300 0.7093 -2.3098 -0.49 -0.10 -0.59
High inertia: 0.000 0.150 0.4382 0.2303 0.7091 -2.3109 -0.53 -0.10 -0.64
Deterministic Steady-state:  0.4404 0.2269 0.7089 -2.2962
Coefficients on Rt-1: No inertia = 0; Historical inertia = 0.6754; High inertia = 1
Rule
Table 7: Welfare Implications of Alternative Monetary Policy Rules
Average levels Welfare Gain (% of SS C t)




C 0.0131 0.0152 0.0169 0.0128 0.0143 0.0141 0.0149 0.0157 0.0140
H 0.0115 0.0101 0.0065 0.0136 0.0148 0.0153 0.0101 0.0072 0.0147
S
us 0.0200 0.0230 0.0276 0.0152 0.0212 0.0216 0.0228 0.0250 0.0209
Y 0.0215 0.0264 0.0307 0.0213 0.0252 0.0253 0.0258 0.0268 0.0244
R 0.0100 0.0121 0.0101 0.0078 0.0159 0.0103 0.0068 0.0061 0.0079
π 0.0090 0.0040 0.0081 0.0075 0.0057 0.0074 0.0042 0.0073 0.0058
π N 0.0086 0.0041 0.0031 0.0070 0.0075 0.0081 0.0043 0.0024 0.0075
π T 0.0176 0.0134 0.0227 0.0162 0.0092 0.0133 0.0137 0.0210 0.0100
π M 0.0169 0.0137 0.0228 0.0153 0.0101 0.0063 0.0135 0.0208 0.0099
π F 0.0102 0.0095 0.0155 0.0021 0.0086 0.0107 0.0094 0.0130 0.0089
Z 0.0210 0.0266 0.0295 0.0218 0.0257 0.0252 0.0260 0.0265 0.0251
Y N 0.0153 0.0185 0.0218 0.0151 0.0164 0.0164 0.0181 0.0201 0.0161
Y T 0.0094 0.0110 0.0103 0.0098 0.0118 0.0112 0.0107 0.0094 0.0114
Y M 0.0075 0.0075 0.0079 0.0075 0.0077 0.0084 0.0075 0.0076 0.0076
Y M 0.0052 0.0052 0.0054 0.0054 0.0051 0.0055 0.0052 0.0053 0.0052
Y M 0.0036 0.0038 0.0038 0.0033 0.0040 0.0041 0.0038 0.0036 0.0039
Y F 0.0103 0.0117 0.0111 0.0107 0.0124 0.0110 0.0115 0.0104 0.0121
Table 8: Simulation Results (2
nd Order Approximation) - Standard Deviations
d
ex
37Ct H t Y t ut Level Variance Total
R t-1 Y t πt
Historical rule 0.675 0.061 0.672 0.4377 0.2293 0.7083 -2.3128 -0.63 -0.09 -0.72
Flex-Prices
π - targeting 0.000 0.000 6.000 0.4406 0.2274 0.7111 -2.2989 0.02 -0.14 -0.11
πN - targeting 0.000 0.000 6.000 0.4398 0.2289 0.7116 -2.3041 -0.17 -0.17 -0.34
Baseline: Imperfect labour mobility  (ς = 1) and sector‐specific K‐adj. costs
π - targeting 0.675 0.000 6.000 0.4402 0.2287 0.7115 -2.3007 -0.07 -0.13 -0.19
πN - targeting 1.000 0.050 1.175 0.4400 0.2284 0.7115 -2.3019 -0.10 -0.14 -0.25
Case 1: Perfect labour mobility (ς = 10000) and common sectoral K‐adj. costs (ψN = ψM = ψX = 19.6)
π - targeting 0.675 0.000 2.775 0.4405 0.3318 0.7117 -2.3280 -0.01 -0.12 -0.13
πN - targeting 1.000 0.050 1.250 0.4401 0.3324 0.7116 -2.3310 -0.11 -0.15 -0.26
Case 2: Perfect labour mobility (ς = 10000) and low sectoral K‐adj. costs (ψN = ψM = ψX = 0.02)
π - targeting 0.675 0.400 6.000 0.4397 0.3322 0.7109 -2.3323 -0.20 -0.11 -0.31
πN - targeting 1.000 0.250 6.000 0.4409 0.3316 0.7127 -2.3263 0.09 -0.14 -0.05
Case 3: Imperfect labour mobility (ς = 1) with low K‐adj. cost only in non‐tradables (ψN = 0.02)
π - targeting 0.675 0.500 6.000 0.4389 0.2291 0.7101 -2.3071 -0.36 -0.10 -0.46
πN - targeting 1.000 0.350 6.000 0.4403 0.2285 0.7120 -2.3010 -0.05 -0.15 -0.20
Deterministic Steady-state:  0.4404 0.2269 0.7089
Table 9: The Role of Capital Adjustment Costs

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































baseline: target  alternative: target  when 
N = 0
Figure 6: The Role of K-Adjustment Costs for Optimal CPI-Inflation Targeting Rules















































































































baseline: target  alternative: target  when 
N = 0
FIgure 7: The Role of K-Adjustment Costs for Optimal CPI-Inflation Targeting Rules
              IRF's to a 1% Technology Shock in the Non-tradables Sector